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Abstract
This Essay examines the practical experience of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (”ICTY”) and, in particular, its Registry with regard to operational matters and
its relevance within the setup of the International Criminal Court (”ICC”). While the first part is
dedicated to the basic legal groundwork that forms the basis for the work of the ICC (including its
financial regulations, a multilateral agreement on its privileges and immunities, and the agreement
governing the relationship between the ICC and the United Nations), the second part deals with
the more practical aspects of the question of how to start an international criminal court from
an operational perspective. In my conclusions, I would like to revert to the practical experience
the ICTY has gained so far and upon which the States Parties could draw when considering the
different operational aspects of setting up this important new international judicial institution.
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INTRODUCTION
This Essay examines the practical experience of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia' ("ICTY")
and, in particular, its Registry with regard to operational matters
and its relevance within the setup of the International Criminal
Court ("ICC"). While the first part is dedicated to the basic legal
groundwork that forms the basis for the work of the ICC (including its financial regulations, a multilateral agreement on its privileges and immunities, and the agreement governing the relationship between the ICC and the United Nations), the second
part deals with the more practical aspects of the question of how
to start an international criminal court from an operational perspective. In my conclusions, I would like to revert to the practical experience the ICTY has gained so far and upon which the
States Parties could draw when considering the different operational aspects of setting up this important new international judicial institution.
I. THE BASIC LEGAL GROUNDWORK FOR THE ICC
It is stating the obvious to say that the basic legal groundwork, in particular the financial regulations, the multilateral
agreement on privileges and immunities, and the relationship
* Registrar, United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. This Essay is a summarization of two addresses to the Plenary of the Preparatory
Commission for the International Criminal Court in New York, held on March 6, 2001
and October 1, 2001, respectively. The author wishes to thank Mr. Sam Muller, Legal
Adviser, and Mr. Nikolaus Toufar, Associate Legal Officer, for their valuable contribution to this Essay.
1. The Security Council resolution on its establishment named the new court the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), amended by U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166 (1998);
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
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agreement between the ICC and the United Nations, will greatly
influence the way in which the ICC will be able to function. In
this context, it will be useful to reflect upon the ICTY's more
recent institutional history before discussing the operational
practicalities of setting up the ICC.
When the ICTY was established, the United Nations started
something new and quite unfamiliar to the organization. An administrative and operational infrastructure that had been built
up over decades to primarily run bodies with secretarial functions and, later, to mount peacekeeping operations and operations to assist refugees, had to be used to set up an international
criminal tribunal for war crimes committed by individuals.
One of the challenges that an international criminal process
in respect of an accused individual holds is that it is a process
that allows for little compromise. If a prosecutor suspects that a
crime within his jurisdiction was committed, he must investigate,
and, if a case presents itself, he must prosecute. If a difficult
legal question arises during the proceedings, it must be fully
dealt with by the judges of that institution. Once the process has
started, internationally recognized human rights standards demand that an accused must have legal representation (paid for
either by himself or assigned by the court in case of indigency).
Moreover, an accused is entitled to get all information that concerns the criminal process-from investigation to prosecution in
court-in his own language. Finally, the same internationally
recognized human rights standards require that an individual
who has been wrongfully accused or convicted be entitled to
some form of compensation.
A criminal process-be it national or international-is,
therefore, largely determined by material and procedural standards which must be met. That has been the reality of the ICTY,
and, in particular, the Registry that under the ICTY Statute
serves both Chambers and the Prosecutor.
In my opinion, the United Nations and its Member States
can be proud of the way the administrative shoe was made to fit
the judicial foot. However, it cannot be a surprise that the fit was
not always perfect, simply because of the difficulties of matching
the needs of an international governmental organization like the
United Nations and international judicial institutions such as the
ad hoc Tribunals.
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In trying to envisage what the ICC will look like and how it is
to be run in the most efficient manner, the ICTY would see,
based on its experience, an institution that in its administration
should have the notion of "flexibility" as the cornerstone of its
modus operandi.
As a practical example, I would like to recall the voluntary
surrender of ten accused on one day in October 1997-which
happened towards the end of the ICTY's budgetary cycle. All
but one accused claimed indigency and requested assignment of
defense counsel. As I indicated above, it is in the nature of a
criminal judicial process that lack of budgeted funds cannot preclude consideration, and, if the appropriate rules are complied
with, approval of such a request. Another example is the sudden
eruption of the crisis in Kosovo, only two and a half months after
the approval of our annual budget for 1999, where the ICTY was
suddenly faced with an acute and fairly considerable need for
funds, manpower, equipment, and the reinforcement of quite
specific expertise. There again, it was in the nature of the criminal judicial process that investigations had to commence without
delay, before much of the potential evidence was contaminated
or destroyed.
In both situations, there was an acute need to act quickly
and to manage funds and assets in light of the tasks assigned to
the ICTY. The Kosovo crisis required a sudden expansion of the
ICTY's field operations. Means had to be found to do this, allowing for a similar decrease when the work was completed. The
sudden increase in October 1997 in the amount of persons in
detention meant that, almost overnight, the holding capacity at
the detention facility of the ICTY had to be enlarged considerably, legal aid expenditure had to be substantially increased, and
that, with very little lead time, assets and expertise had to be directed towards creating more courtroom capacity.
The ICTY has also experienced that financial regulations
and rules which strive for full transparency-in itself an essential
aim-do not always correspond with the sometimes delicate circumstances under which vulnerable witnesses called by the court
need their financial arrangements taken care of. We have found
that many of the assumptions on the basis of which travel arrangements are made for staff and other persons on mission for
the ICTY, rarely apply to this category of persons. Many of our
witnesses are victim witnesses who have suffered greatly as a re-
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sult of war. They have lost family members, housing and property, and are often unemployed. Few of them have traveled by
air before, let alone to another country. Many are also refugees
or internally displaced persons, trying to put their lives back together in very difficult post-conflict circumstances. Some are at
risk, in view of the testimony they give. In some cases, these witnesses do not even have valid travel documents and have expressed fear to approach their national authorities to obtain
such documents. It has proven to be very difficult for the Registry to ensure full confidentiality and to obtain all the relevant
documentation when arranging services such as travel, temporary housing, and medical services for such sensitive witnesses
while, at the same time, fully complying with the established financial practices of the United Nations.
Accordingly, in'light of these experiences, I would like to
reiterate the point made by Judge May in his address to the Plenary of the Preparatory Commission on March 20, 2000, that it is
crucial that the financial regulations and rules of the ICC, aswell
as its procurement rules, include specific provisions applicable
to victims and witnesses and their unique needs. To his appeal,
the need for adequate and clear arrangements in the agreement
on privileges and immunities should be added, taking into account that many witnesses and victims will not be willing to travel
and testify without a family member, a friend, or some form of
legal representation with them.
Along the same vein, the ICTY has found that the privileges
and immunities designed for, and customarily granted to, U.N.
staff members and State representatives do not always easily
translate into a well-defined legal status that can enable a defense team to work effectively. We have been faced with the difficult question of having to determine who is part of that defense
team and, once that has been determined, which privileges and
immunities each member of that team require. Similar questions of scope can also be asked regarding the special legal status
to be accorded to other categories of persons strange to the U.N.
mold: counsel other than defense counsel (for instance, a legal
representative of a victim); accused; and even suspects. To this
category of strangeness, representatives of nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"), which provide essential services or other
assistance to the ICTY, should also be added.
Each of these categories of persons has an essential role in
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the criminal process, and the ICTY found it to be 'ofthe utmost
importance that their legal status is defined as clearly and explicitly as possible.
II. HOW TO START AN INTERNATIONAL CRJMINAL COURT
FROM AN OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE?
Once the basic legal groundwork is laid, it is important to
ensure that the ICC, from this stage onwards, possesses a socalled "engine room," fully equipped to tackle the operational
questions of how to start an international criminal court. In this
regard, I would like to note that, unlike other treaty-based international organizations such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons ("OPCW"), the Preparatory Commission of the ICC has not opted for the institution of a "Provisional
Secretariat," which would be mandated to decide on such operational issues from the date of ratification onwards. In the case of
the ICC, that is the day of the last ratification ("Day One"). The
importance for the ICC to start preparing itself operationally as
of Day One cannot be emphasized enough, especially in view of
the likelihood that NGOs might bring cases before the ICC as
early as that date. The fact that the election process and the
installation of the main high officials of the ICC (namely the
Judges, the Prosecutor, and the Registrar) could take between
six and eight months from Day One should not distract from the
fact that a basic administrative structure will already be required
before that time, namely as early as Day One itself.
As a representative of an organization faced with many of
these questions when it started operations eight years ago, and as
an individual who is now involved in dealing with some of the
omissions which occurred at that time, I feel the particular need
to share our experience with the ICC at the earliest possible
stage. These remarks, however, should be understood with the
full realization that the ICC will, in certain respects, be different
from the two ad hoc Tribunals, and that therefore not all the "dos
and don'ts" which applied to the ICTY will be fully relevant for
the ICC.
My first remark is to once again stress the imperative need
for flexibility as an inherent cornerstone of an organization in the
making. In engine terms: a motor which can be maintained
cost effectively while waiting to be used when the need arises
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(often unexpectedly), to carry cargo and to climb uphill roads.
This notion of flexibility should also be supplemented with the
word scalability, to indicate that the flexibility required should
enable the ICC to scale its operations upwards and downwards as
dictated by circumstances and also on short notice.
From the day of its establishment onwards, the ICTY possessed a basic administrative system and people trained to work
within that system, namely the U.N.-internal rules and regulations. These were financial, procurement, recruitment, and staff
rules, which helped, for instance, enable the hiring and payment
of individuals who could subsequently commence the lengthy
process of negotiating a lease for a building. There were basic
systems in place to deal with the most rudimentary security concerns the ICTY was faced with, even though that system did not
in any way take into account the specific information security
requirements required by a judicial institution with many sensitive witnesses and highly confidential material.
The system at the disposal of the ICTY was not perfect, but it
did enable the ICTY to direct its resources and start work on the
additional, ICTY-specific systems that needed to be put in place.
These systems included a court-archiving system, rules of detention, rules governing the assignment of defense counsel, regulations regarding visits to and communication with detainees,
model agreements on enforcement of sentences and relocation
of witnesses, investigation protocols, information security directives, security directives and protocols for staff in the field, codes
of conduct for defense counsel, procedures and protocols for
the handling of evidence, a framework within which to deal with
claims by wrongly accused or convicted persons, and, as a final
example, a code of ethics for interpreters.
It is my strong recommendation that such systems are set up
for the ICC before it is asked to face the challenge of its first
case, giving due consideration to the fact that it will take time
and effort to put those systems in place.
As stated above, the ICTY availed itself of the U.N. rules and
procedures relating to personnel, such as recruitment and staff
rules, the U.N. Joint Staff Pension Fund, and the U.N. Administrative Tribunal. However, the ICTY subsequently found that
these arrangements do not sufficiently allow the ICTY to address
the challenges of the labor market from which an international
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criminal court must recruit-something that will also affect the
sustainability of the ICC in the long run. For instance, a large
segment of the ICTY's workforce, the lawyers, are merit-oriented, job-mobile individuals, who leave a national
prosecutorial, judicial, or academic career, or a position within a
law firm, to work in the area of international criminal law for
three to five years, only to move on to other things thereafter or
to get called back to serve their own government once more.
Such employees require flexibility regarding the pension and
health insurance scheme in which they can participate, and job
classification systems, which fully take their experience into account.
The ICC will also have to consider that some of the essential
expertise it requires will be rare-few pathologists have experience with the exhumation of mass graves in war zones-and
such expertise will need to be obtained and put to the use of the
ICC in a flexible way, which meets the demands of the labor
market.
A second more general point concerns the types of individuals who are initially recruited. The importance of having highly
competent, experienced, sufficiently senior staff in place right
from the beginning cannot be emphasized enough. The ICTY
would warn against thinking that there would not be all that
much work in the beginning and that therefore recruitment at a
lower, more junior level would suffice. The direct opposite is
true. We would advise that, after having identified the key legal
and administrative functions that are required, recruitment at a
top-level take place.
In organizational terms, it will provide the ICC, from Day
One onwards, with a capacity to establish systems, protocols, and
training mechanisms to deal responsibly with the surge of activities that an exercise ofjurisdiction in accordance with Article 13
of the ICC Statute2 will necessitate. Those systems and protocols', together with the subsequent training will be the foundation upon which adequate preliminary fact finding and analysis,
a successful investigation, and, thereafter, a prosecution will be
built. In blunt financial terms, the initial recruitment at the ap2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9*
(1998), art. 13, availableat http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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propriate level of seniority is an investment that will save money
later. It will give room for the executives of the organization to
set up required management and work structures themselves,
without being tied to detailed configurations which have been
pre-determined.
The logic of the ICC Statute dictates that, unlike the ICTY,
it will not be possible to have the most senior administrator, the
Registrar, in place when the Judges and the Prosecutor have
been elected. That same Statute has also given that Registrar a
different position within the organization as compared to the
Registrar of the ad hoc Tribunals.
For the Presidency and the Prosecutor to be able to work, a
minimum degree of infrastructure needs to be available immediately after they have been elected. Some common services
should therefore be made available to both the Office of the
Prosecutor and the judiciary, which will enable them to fulfill
the responsibilities in accordance with Articles 42, 38, and 43 of
the ICC Statute, 3 respectively. Within the separate powers assigned to them, they need to be able to share building management facilities, start to recruit, pay salaries, use phones and computers, purchase goods, and the like. Those common services
would have to be provided in close cooperation with the host
State, which will be making certain contributions to that infrastructure as part of its bid.
In the current stage of the start-up process, it would be of
some value to refine in some more detail the level of understanding as to facilities being part of those common services and
facilities outside this common structure. In this connection, the
ICTY stands ready to share its hard-won specialized experience
in these areas. These areas include computer systems, the requirements for a building, the minimum security requirements,
the technical equipment required for a court room, the records
management tools available on today's market, the ways and
means of providing adequate language services for the ICC's
work, and many more. Cost effectiveness demands that the right
decisions are made in the first year, necessitating adequate information of the specific operational requirements of an international criminal court.
In addition, one might try to conceive ways of getting in
3. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 38, 42, 43.
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place, as soon as possible after Day One, an able and experienced individual who could start building up a core group of
specialists in the various court-related areas. Over time, this
group would expand into a common services unit, headed by the
above-mentioned manager. A limited startup budget, set aside
at the first Assembly of States Parties could be considered as a
basis in this regard. The interim head of common services could
provisionally apply some administrative and financial rules previously agreed to. Subsequently, and after the election of the
Judges, the Prosecutor, and the Registrar, the common services
infrastructure could be used to allow the senior management
team to set up the final structure within their respective fields of
responsibility, using the common services as a common tool.
CONCLUSION
Both ad hoc Tribunals possess some years of experience in
translating statutory requirements of an international criminal
court into a practical, cost-effective, and manageable organizational structure. The ICTY was called upon to share its experience in the informal meetings of the various working groups of
the Preparatory Commission and gladly complied with these requests.
In this regard, the ICTY feels the need to once again stress
the importance of the time factor in the ICC's operational planning, in particular the above-mentioned scenarios related to Day
One. The ICTY views the recent concrete steps taken by the host
State of the ICC with regard to identifying interim premises and
other operational matters as most encouraging. The proposed
interim premises are located in close vicinity of the ICTY, which
will allow, where possible, an easy sharing of expertise and resources-for instance, shared use of the ICTY's legal library by
officials of the ICC in the startup period.
I am confident that further cooperation, in full recognition
of the different structures and requirements of the ICC, will actively contribute to its swift setup in operational terms and ensure that the ICC will soon be able to commence its core tasks,
namely, to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of
international justice, as stated in the Preamble of its Statute.

